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Abstract.  This paper aims to prove that in countries with no inter-zonal real estate 
divergence caused by lack of uniform economic development, labor migration trends or 
other causes, the real estate price movements tend to be correlated with currency 
movements, thus a certain vulnerability to hot money exists however it may be 
manageable.   
 
Globalization, the important phenomenon of the late XX
th century which advocates 
free movement of capital internationally as well as free trade, generally allocates risk capital 
into 3 classes: direct investment, stock market investment and real estate investment.  
Direct investment, is prone to follow cheap labor and low corporate tax rates: recent 
outsourcing trends show that India, China and Eastern Europe, all large beneficiaries of the 
outsourcing process, are all countries that provide less expensive, educated labor and 
competitive tax rates.  
Outsourcing generates global deflation and immediate domestic deflation since 
decisions to outsource are made in principal on domestic estimated demand rather than on 
export plans (Source: of 50 officers of US companies that answered yes to outsourcing on a 
Labor Department questionnaire who were polled, 38 had no export plans).  
For developed countries, if we assume that at the limit, over a large period of time, all 
M&A deals will lead to oligopoly, achieve pricing power and ultimately lead to price 
increases, outsourcing is a countering phenomenon if all domestic labor force can be 
reallocated, since it offers a competitive opportunity to lower prices and keep the same 
margins since cost is lower, creating a positive supply shock (see graph).  
Outsourcing as a percentage of GDP kept a constant mean and has reached double 
digit levels between 1997 and 2007 in countries such as Bulgaria and Romania, as well as 
strong 1 digit numbers in countries such as China and India (source Bloomberg).  
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The stock market investment decision rests on diversification and growth. In the era of 
outsourcing and free capital movement, growth is linked to skilled labor and mobility, thus 
direct investment should relate to stock market returns. This hypothesis is proven by the 
spectacular ascent of stock markets in the beneficiaries of outsourcing – see attached stats for 




The increased integration of the stock markets between developed and developing 
countries is a recent phenomenon whose origin we think also to be globalization. Recent 
reversal of historical negative correlations between emerging markets stock market 
performance and the mature stock exchanges shown in the 60s and the 70s can be explained 
by the fact that in the globalization post cold-war era of no tariffs and low transportation 
costs, direct investment will find global opportunities, leading to global industrial competition 
given that no insulated demand pockets exist. Therefore diversification between the emerging 
markets stock market investments and the more mature markets is no longer justified by a 
negative correlation coefficient between their performances (see following graphs where 
recent correlation between Dow Jones and the India, China and Romania Stock Exchange 
indexes is strongly positive). 
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The link between direct investment, outsourcing and stock market returns is strong 
since the utilization of production factors can be geographically chosen selectively: 
Since production can be achieved with a certain ratio of labor to capital, and for 
countries with no capital flow restrictions, capital does not get more expensive in a country or 
other as at least multinational corporations can engage in carry trades and borrow capital in 
the least expensive place (see recent carry trades done out of Japan), the skill and cost of the 
labor market would be the main driver of the reason to invest or move production if corporate 
tax would be equalized across vast zones. This because the cost of the steady-state labor ratio 
as defined by the Solow-Swan neoclassical growth model can be reduced by less expensive 
steady-state labor, therefore providing an incentive to invest, and decreasing the capital 
intensity. Thus the “required” growth rate of capital to keep the capital-labor ratio steady gK
r 
= (dK/dt)/K = n is less than in mature economies. Some food for thought thus exists why 
Japan was left with negative interest rates for a long time during the 1990s depression all else 
equal, since the capital surplus did not evaporate due to the availability of lower cost labor 
zones such as the outsourcing beneficiaries, thus the interest rate has not been bid up for a 
long time.  
A legitimate question thus emerges whether real estate investment is a distinct, 
uncorrelated asset class. 
Real estate investment is also dependent on the 2 factors mentioned above, 
diversification and growth. Once the investment is made, real estate investors would compare 
their investments with the historical stock market returns. An intuitive benchmark for 
comparison purposes would be the historical 7% US expectation.  
We are arguing that real estate investors beyond their first home would enter the 
investment if a 7% per year cumulative return exists and would attempt to exit their 
investment if the 7% expectation is not met.  
Let’s suppose that this investment decision would be unchanged if the exchange rate 
of the currency of the country in which the investment will take place belongs to a country 
that has not had a currency shock for the past 5 years and which has not had yearly 
depreciation of more than 10% in the past 1 year against a trade-weighted basket of   Eurozone – a sensible absorption of risk capital?  47 
international currencies, thus allowing the real estate investment to act as a natural hedge 
against currency depreciation. 
For the US, UK, Australia, South Africa and Romania, we regress on a monthly basis 
the yearly cumulative difference between the appreciation of the domestic housing market 
index as calculated by the national housing regulator and the 7% stock market yearly return 
expectation, against the monthly change of the domestic exchange rate against a foreign trade-
weighted basket of currencies. We normalize the starting point for the 2 data sets at 100. 
Δ FX = a + b Δ (House Index – 7%/12) + ε  
 
Basket Name:  User Defined   
Start Date:  2/28/2001 7/31/2007    
Period: Monthly       
Base Currency:  USD       
        
Average Annual Excess Return:  -5.22%      
Annualized Standard Deviation:  6.80%      
Sharpe Ratio:  -0.77      
        
Long Basket    ShortBasket     
Currency Weight  Currency  Weight Normalized Weight 
USD 1 JPY  8 0.285714
   EUR  5 0.178571
   GBP  4 0.142857
   CHF  1 0.035714
   BRL  5 0.178571
   NZD  1 0.035714
   AUD  1 0.035714
   SEK  1 0.035714
   HKD  1 0.035714
   DKK  1 0.035714






Index change – 7% 
2/28/2001 100.00  100.00 
3/30/2001 105.41  100.86 
4/30/2001 104.16  101.71 
5/31/2001 106.10  102.57 
6/29/2001 106.56  103.16 
7/31/2001 106.47  103.70 
8/31/2001 103.55  104.25 
9/28/2001 104.56  104.79 
10/31/2001 105.43  105.22 
11/30/2001 104.16  105.65 
12/31/2001 104.19  106.08 
1/31/2002 106.75  106.62 
2/28/2002 105.15  107.15 
3/29/2002 103.92  107.68 
4/30/2002 101.62  108.29 
5/31/2002 99.91  108.90 





Index change – 7% 
7/31/2002 101.97  110.23 
8/30/2002 98.70  110.95 
9/30/2002 102.92  111.67 
10/31/2002 102.09  112.18 
11/29/2002 101.93  112.70 
12/31/2002 98.14  113.22 
1/31/2003 96.64  113.65 
2/28/2003 96.57  114.09 
3/31/2003 94.93  114.53 
4/30/2003 91.50  114.94 
5/30/2003 89.67  115.35 
6/30/2003 89.14  115.76 
7/31/2003 90.75  116.32 
8/29/2003 90.53  116.88 
9/30/2003 86.16  117.45 
10/31/2003 85.10  118.54 
11/28/2003 84.01  119.63 
12/31/2003 81.26  120.72 
1/30/2004 80.87  121.29 
2/27/2004 80.91  121.87 
3/31/2004 80.13  122.45 
4/30/2004 82.86  123.35 
5/31/2004 82.76  124.26 
6/30/2004 81.98  125.16 
7/30/2004 82.48  126.61 
8/31/2004 80.97  128.06 
9/30/2004 79.89  129.51 
10/29/2004 77.86  130.33 
11/30/2004 74.95  131.15 
12/31/2004 73.94  131.97 
1/31/2005 74.90  132.86 
2/28/2005 74.18  133.75 
3/31/2005 75.81  134.65 
4/29/2005 74.34  135.82 
5/31/2005 75.99  136.99 
6/30/2005 76.53  138.17 
7/29/2005 77.28  139.27 
8/31/2005 75.86  140.37 
9/30/2005 76.39  141.47 
10/31/2005 77.13  142.45 
11/30/2005 78.08  143.44 
12/30/2005 78.46  144.42 
1/31/2006 76.51  145.16 
2/28/2006 76.52  145.89 
3/31/2006 77.23  146.63 
4/28/2006 74.25  147.07 
5/31/2006 74.82  147.51 
6/30/2006 74.61  147.94 





Index change – 7% 
8/31/2006 74.51  148.69 
9/29/2006 75.36  149.06 
10/31/2006 74.48  149.48 
11/30/2006 73.19  149.90 
12/29/2006 73.70  150.32 
1/31/2007 74.32  150.46 
2/28/2007 73.59  150.61 
3/30/2007 72.83  148.65 
4/30/2007 72.22  147.45 
5/31/2007 72.34  146.25 
6/29/2007 72.20  145.25 
7/31/2007 70.80  143.5 
 
SUMMARY  OUTPUT           
             
Regression Statistics           
Multiple  R  0.928678           
R  Square  0.862444           
Adjusted R Square  0.860634             
Standard  Error  4.61209           
Observations  78           
             
ANOVA             
   df  SS  MS  F 
Significance 
F    
Regression 1  10135.8337 10135.83 476.5012 1.793E-34    
Residual 76  1616.62432 21.27137        
Total  77  11752.458             
             
   Coefficients 
Standard 





Intercept 173.4049  4.02485506 43.08352 3.71E-55 165.388704  181.42111 179.740672
X Variable 1  -0.69036  0.03162576 -21.8289 1.79E-34 -0.753344  -0.627367 -0.6146884
 
Basket Name:  User Defined       
Start Date:  3/30/2001   End Date:  7/31/2007   
Period: Monthly        
Base Currency:  GBP         
          
Average Annual 
Excess Return:  5.00%        
Annualized 
Standard Deviation:  6.01%      
Sharpe Ratio:  0.83        
          
Long Basket      ShortBasket     
Currency Weight 
Normalized 
Weight Currency  Weight 
Normalized 
Weight 
GBP 1 1 JPY  7  0.304348 50 CICERO I. LIMBEREA 
     USD  7  0.304348 
     CHF  2  0.086957 
     CAD  1  0.043478 
     EUR  1  0.043478 
     AUD  1  0.043478 
     SEK  1  0.043478 
     CZK  1  0.043478 
     IDR  1  0.043478 





UK Housing Index 
change – 7% 
3/30/2001 100  100.00
4/30/2001 100.3828  100.44
5/31/2001 99.24196  100.67
6/29/2001 100.4112  101.40
7/31/2001 99.88571  102.08
8/31/2001 99.30561  102.34
9/28/2001 101.6553  104.40
10/31/2001 101.5054  103.65
11/30/2001 99.55165  103.83
12/31/2001 103.8183  104.97
1/31/2002 102.186  105.07
2/28/2002 101.99  106.09
3/29/2002 102.0514  106.06
4/30/2002 102.3749  108.88
5/31/2002 99.85368  110.33
6/28/2002 102.5601  112.60
7/31/2002 105.7833  114.20
8/30/2002 104.4181  115.97
9/30/2002 106.6192  117.56
10/31/2002 106.6366  118.44
11/29/2002 106.0993  119.80
12/31/2002 107.5823  120.78
1/31/2003 109.6137  121.88
2/28/2003 103.9782  121.57
3/31/2003 104.6931  122.72
4/30/2003 105.251  122.12
5/30/2003 106.2593  122.79
6/30/2003 108.2785  123.31
7/31/2003 106.844  123.65
8/29/2003 104.2444  124.32
9/30/2003 106.405  125.04
10/31/2003 108.3501  126.52
11/28/2003 109.108  127.10
12/31/2003 111.3102  128.40
1/30/2004 113.9259  128.42
2/27/2004 117.9319  130.48
3/31/2004 115.4581  131.35
4/30/2004 114.5998  132.57
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6/30/2004 116.9353  133.93
7/30/2004 118.3579  135.22
8/31/2004 116.5062  134.74
9/30/2004 116.6448  134.55
10/29/2004 115.9089  133.92
11/30/2004 118.2505  134.24
12/31/2004 118.7064  133.51
1/31/2005 118.319  132.98
2/28/2005 120.6685  132.99
3/31/2005 120.7503  132.07
4/29/2005 121.7275  132.13
5/31/2005 118.6156  132.00
6/30/2005 118.5394  131.30
7/29/2005 117.0934  130.97
8/31/2005 119.0999  130.48
9/30/2005 118.1546  129.73
10/31/2005 119.8135  130.24
11/30/2005 118.5342  129.55
12/30/2005 117.4044  129.35
1/31/2006 119.7382  130.24
2/28/2006 118.35  129.57
3/31/2006 117.976  130.29
4/28/2006 120.7994  129.74
5/31/2006 123.2269  129.56
6/30/2006 122.7267  129.29
7/31/2006 124.0816  129.85
8/31/2006 127.4231  130.03
9/29/2006 126.326  130.78
10/31/2006 127.9395  130.96
11/30/2006 130.4786  131.73
12/29/2006 131.4531  132.34
1/31/2007 133.4693  132.10
2/28/2007 132.4046  132.24
3/30/2007 132.1523  132.15
4/30/2007 134.1579  132.49
5/31/2007 133.9934  132.41
6/29/2007 136.5644  132.88
7/31/2007 136.3332  132.38
 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT             
              
Regression Statistics            
Multiple R  0.808837             
R Square  0.654217             
Adjusted R 
Square  0.649607            
Standard 
Error 6.262775             
Observations 77           
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ANOVA              
   df  SS  MS  F  Significance F    
Regression 1  5565.623804  5565.624 141.8993 5.7185E-19   
Residual 75  2941.676085  39.22235        
Total  76  8507.299889              
              
   Coefficients 
Standard 





Intercept 18.02319  8.109625307  2.222445 0.029267 1.86798762 34.1784  34.1783993
X Variable 1  0.777463  0.065266387  11.91215 5.72E-19 0.64744561 0.90748  0.90748029
 
Basket Name:  User Defined         
Start Date:  2/28/2001    End Date:  7/31/2007    
Period: Monthly           
Base Currency:  AUD           
            
Average Annual 
Excess Return:  5.75%           
Annualized 
Standard Deviation:  8.54%           
Sharpe Ratio:  0.67           
            
Long Basket        ShortBasket     
Currency Weight  Normalized Weight  Currency  Weight 
Normalized 
Weight 
AUD 1  1   JPY  8  0.228571 
       EUR  5  0.142857 
       GBP  4  0.114286 
       CHF  1  0.028571 
       BRL  5  0.142857 
       NZD  1  0.028571 
       USD  8  0.228571 
       SEK  1  0.028571 
       HKD  1  0.028571 
       DKK  1  0.028571 
 
Date  FX AUD change   AU Housing Index change – 7% 
2/28/2001 100  100
3/30/2001 95.98153  97.25
4/30/2001 100.4283  98.55
5/31/2001 100.7426  98.75
6/29/2001 102.2309  99.15
7/31/2001 101.8729  99.45
8/31/2001 103.6722  99.65
9/28/2001 96.81032  99.85
10/31/2001 100.0241  100.05
11/30/2001 103.0667  101.25
12/31/2001 100.7544  101.55
1/31/2002 102.5733  102.35
2/28/2002 103.6693  103.25
3/29/2002 105.9136  104.55
4/30/2002 105.3766  104.65
5/31/2002 110.0138  106.85
6/28/2002 107.808  106.95
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8/30/2002 106.3879 107.15 
9/30/2002 108.6819 108.05 
10/31/2002 110.7664 108.35 
11/29/2002 112.2182 108.95 
12/31/2002 109.3078 109.25 
1/31/2003 113.3713 110.57 
2/28/2003 117.8458 114.85 
3/31/2003 115.755 114.95 
4/30/2003 116.9667 115.95 
5/30/2003 120.3195 118.45 
6/30/2003 124.04 120.21 
7/31/2003 121.4344 120.55 
8/29/2003 121.296 120.65 
9/30/2003 122.9635 120.95 
10/31/2003 127.4384 121.25 
11/28/2003 129.3757 121.45 
12/31/2003 131.4322 121.55 
1/30/2004 133.53 121.85 
2/27/2004 135.7188 122.45 
3/31/2004 133.8882 122.65 
4/30/2004 129.5056 122.75 
5/31/2004 128.8245 122.85 
6/30/2004 125.3213 122.85 
7/30/2004 126.9709 122.95 
8/31/2004 125.7453 123.05 
9/30/2004 129.0549 124.56 
10/29/2004 130.4733 124.85 
11/30/2004 131.1619 125.25 
12/31/2004 131.3421 125.65 
1/31/2005 132.1912 125.95 
2/28/2005 134.2657 126 
3/31/2005 133.5925 126.15 
4/29/2005 133.2625 126 
5/31/2005 131.3385 126.1 
6/30/2005 133.5053 127.05 
7/29/2005 133.6855 127.15 
8/31/2005 131.6694 127 
9/30/2005 133.801 127.25 
10/31/2005 132.4573 127.25 
11/30/2005 132.0151 127.35 
12/30/2005 131.6833 128.45 
1/31/2006 133.7444 127.95 
2/28/2006 130.9363 128.8 
3/31/2006 127.2448 128.85 
4/28/2006 130.9704 129.95 
5/31/2006 130.5538 129.85 
6/30/2006 128.5334 130.65 
7/31/2006 132.819 131.95 
8/31/2006 132.3484 132.54 
9/29/2006 130.4223 132.65 
10/31/2006 134.2661 134.45 
11/30/2006 135.1831 134.65 
12/29/2006 135.9708 135 
1/31/2007 134.9054 135.25 
2/28/2007 135.8646 136.35 
3/30/2007 138.4857 138.19 
4/30/2007 141.4568 139.45 54 CICERO I. LIMBEREA 
5/31/2007 141.383  141
6/29/2007 145.0225  142.65
7/31/2007 143.2874  143.25
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT           
            
Regression Statistics          
Multiple R  0.969583           
R Square  0.940092           
Adjusted R 
Square 0.939304          
Standard Error  3.319903           
Observations 78           
            
ANOVA            
   df  SS  MS  F 
Significance 
F   
Regression 1  13144.70158 13144.7 1192.614 3.29E-48  
Residual 76  837.653357 11.02175      
Total  77  13982.35494           
            
   Coefficients 
Standard 
Error  t Stat  P-value  Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% 
Intercept -2.24971  3.639695286 -0.6181 0.538355 -9.4988  4.999382
X Variable 1  1.042839  0.030197246 34.53425 3.29E-48 0.982696  1.102982
            
 
Basket Name:  User Defined           
Start Date:  2/28/2001   End Date:    7/31/2007    
Period: Monthly             
Base Currency:  ZAR             
              
Average Annual Excess 
Return:  2.62%           
Annualized Standard 
Deviation: 16.61%            
Sharpe Ratio:  0.16            
              
Long Basket          ShortBasket   
Currency Weight 
Normalized 
Weight   Currency  Weight 
Normalized 
Weight 
ZAR 1 1     JPY  7  0.233333 
         EUR  5  0.166667 
         GBP  4  0.133333 
         CHF  1  0.033333 
         BRL  5  0.166667 
         NZD  1  0.033333 
         USD  4  0.133333 
         SEK  1  0.033333 
         HKD  1  0.033333 
         DKK  1  0.033333 
 
Date  FX ZAR change  SA House Index change – 7% 
2/28/2001 100  100.00
3/30/2001 100.5149  103.82
























































12/30/2005 138.9468 280.8556 CICERO I. LIMBEREA 
1/31/2006 142.2343  283.60
2/28/2006 139.9705  284.60
3/31/2006 140.941  287.25
4/28/2006 140.3599  290.45
5/31/2006 126.3272  291.35
6/30/2006 118.4012  292.15
7/31/2006 122.5498  300.55
8/31/2006 118.3441  302.85
9/29/2006 111.0088  303.61
10/31/2006 116.2257  309.61
11/30/2006 118.275  315.23
12/29/2006 121.7962  318.48
1/31/2007 119.3376  320.27
2/28/2007 118.5954  322.60
3/30/2007 117.5349  323.23
4/30/2007 119.9392  324.90
5/31/2007 119.7968  325.20
6/29/2007 121.3167  325.48
7/31/2007 118.1428  325.62
 
SUMMARY  OUTPUT         
           
Regression Statistics         
Multiple  R  0.683344         
R  Square  0.466959         
Adjusted R 
Square  0.459945         
Standard  Error  14.62296         
Observations  78         
           
ANOVA           
   df  SS  MS  F 
Significance 
F   
Regression 1  14236.43  14236.43 66.57803 5.45E-12  
Residual 76  16251.14  213.8308      
Total  77  30487.58            
           
   Coefficients 
Standard 
Error  t Stat  P-value  Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% 
Intercept 76.69816  5.032064  15.24189 8.11E-25 66.67593  86.7204 
X Variable 1  0.184097  0.022562  8.159536 5.45E-12 0.139161  0.229034 
 
Basket Name:  User Defined         
Start Date:  3/31/2005    End Date:  7/31/2007  
Period: Monthly       
Base Currency:  RON         
          
Average Annual 
Excess Return:  13.20%         
Annualized 
Standard Deviation:  6.69%        
Sharpe Ratio:  1.97         
          
Long Basket      ShortBasket       Eurozone – a sensible absorption of risk capital?  57 
Currency Weight 
Normalized 
Weight Currency  Weight 
Normalized 
Weight 
RON 1 1 JPY  7  0.233333 
     EUR  9  0.3 
     USD  4  0.133333 
     CHF  3  0.1 
     TRY  1  0.033333 
     NZD  1  0.033333 
     CAD  1  0.033333 
     SEK  1  0.033333 
     HKD  1  0.033333 
     AUD  2  0.066667 
 































SUMMARY  OUTPUT         
            
Regression Statistics          
Multiple R  0.974942           
R Square  0.950512           
Adjusted R 
Square  0.948679          58 CICERO I. LIMBEREA 
Standard Error  2.442559           
Observations 29          
            
ANOVA           
   df  SS  MS  F  Significance F   
Regression 1  3093.947  3093.947 518.5883 3.7E-19  
Residual 27  161.0846  5.966095      
Total  28  3255.031            
            
   Coefficients 
Standard 
Error  t Stat  P-value  Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% 
Intercept 74.5738  1.700936  43.8428 1.25E-26 71.08377  78.06383
X Variable 1  0.278076  0.012211  22.77253 3.7E-19 0.253021  0.303131
 
For all 5 regressions, an Rsq and t-stat nil hypothesis rejection shows that the link 
between house prices and exchage rate trends is strong and cannot be ignored. 
For the countries with floating exchange rate regimes, USA, UK and Australia, the 
slope is higher, thus a higher percentage of the exchange rate volatility is explained by house 
price movements. For the countries with fixed exchange rate regimes, Romania and South 
Africa, the slope is lower.  
The US example seems to suggest that the unwinding of the perceived real estate 
bubble is associated with devaluation. However the annualized negative trend of the USD 
against the trade-weighted basket of currencies is still within the annual negative 10% band as 
we assumed apriori. A further analysis (see last 5 data points) after the subprime mortgage 
crisis shows that investors exiting the real estate market are causing a more severe 
depreciation, although more severe expectations are contained since the subprime MBS recent 
crisis has been pinpointed to only the subprime sector and contagion to the higher MBS 
tranches has not occurred (source: US Treasury, 2007). The negative slope shows that the real 
estate market investments in the US are hedges to the US dollar. However since the US 
benefits from abundant internal capital due to high stock market PER multipliers besides a 
positive capital account, notwithstanding the balance of payments deficit, a vulnerability to 
hot money does not exist. Thus people trying to diversify their holdings are investing in the 
real estate market and the real estate market still benefits from allocations out of a pure 
diversification reason.  
For all other countries examined, except the EU, the slope of the regressions is 
positive thus large capital inflows or outflows can cause perturbations.  
The UK example with the lower Rsq below but high positive slope seems to suggest 
that the recent appreciation of the pound is faster than the growth of the real estate index and 
investors are not entering anticipating a bubble in the real state market, consistent with current 
specialist opinions and waiting for a correction level associated with the bubble break. The 
Bank of England has kept high interest rates throughout the measurement period. This weaker 
Rsq has been expected since the UK real estate market has been perceived by many analysts 
to be in a bubble. It would be interesting to monitor in future if a downturn in the strength of 
the pound would induce the unwinding of the bubble, or a more mild reversal of the index.  
The Australian and Romanian examples are strong and show strong currency 
appreciation partly induced by strong performance of real estate investments and continued 
real estate investments induced by expected continuing strong real estate performance.    Eurozone – a sensible absorption of risk capital?  59 
The UE case: 
 
In Spain the CPI fell below the ECB refinancing rate prior to the adoption of the Euro. 
Thus the country met the Maastricht criteria and could adhere to the Euro. Post adoption, due 
to the sudden high investment, the CPI index rose above the EU average refinancing rate, 
which induced self perpetuating higher inflation than in the rest of the Euro zone until Spain 
adopted a direct inflation targeting and its CPI was driven below the ECB refinancing rate. 
During this time, the Spain real estate displayed strong growth (see graph), having been 
correlated with the Spain CPI index and the refinancing rate in Euro zone.  
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At the same time the real estate index in other EU countries, such as Germany (see 
graph) turned negative. 
 
 
Thus because of the lack of concerted correlation between real estate indexes in EU 
members, a calculation of the overall influence of the real estate market against the Euro 
would not be pertinent. Thus for the Euro zone the real estate analytics should be drilled down 
to individual countries. The euro appears to be an export-driven currency, in which the 
budget/ capital account fundamentals have a higher bearing on the direction of the currency, 
allowing the Euro zone to be able to cushion hot money without high currency moves.    Eurozone – a sensible absorption of risk capital?  61 
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